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Abstract
SBTC is a powerful mechanism in explaining the increasing gap between educated
and uneducated wages. However, SBTC cannot mimic the US within-group wage
inequality. This paper provides an explanation for the observed intra-college group
inequality by showing that the top decile earners’ significant wage growth is under-
pinned by the link between ex ante ability, math-heavy college majors and highly
quantitative occupations. We develop a general equilibrium model with multiple edu-
cation outcomes, where wages are driven by individuals’ ex ante abilities and acquired
math skills. A large portion of within-group and general wage inequality is explained
by math-biased technical change (MBTC).
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1 Introduction
Math is a language of logic. It is a disciplined, organized way of thinking.
There is a right answer; there are rules that must be followed. More than any
other subject, math is rigor distilled. Mastering the language of logic helps to
embed higher-order habits in kids’ minds: the ability to reason, for example,
to detect patterns and to make informed guesses. Those kinds of skills [have]
rising value in a world in which information [is] cheap and messy.1
The US has seen a large rise in wage inequality since the mid-1970s (see Figure 1). While
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) can match the average wage trend as measured by
the college wage premium (i.e., college/non-college), the large and increasing within-group
wage inequality is ignored. This paper documents the increasing importance of math skills
in the labor market, where labor augmenting technical change biased toward math skills
can account for a large part of the observed within-group inequality.
Determining which individuals are driving wage inequality and what makes them special
yields three facts that support math as a driver of wage inequality:
1. Highly quantitative occupations have exhibited increasing relative wages since the
mid-1970s.
2. Highly quantitative occupations and the math content of college majors are highly
correlated.
3. Students attempt to study majors with the highest math content, but are constrained
by their initial abilities.2
Two distinct trends emerge when measuring the importance of general ability and
1Amanda Ripley, The Smartest Kids in the World: And How They Got That Way
2Note, we use the terms “initial-” and “ex ante” ability interchangeably. Initial or ex ante ability refers
to the ability an individual has upon completing high school.
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Source: IPUMS-CPS (see King et al., 2010). Log wages are residual wages from a regression of hourly log
wages of full-time (at least 35 hours of work and 40 weeks per year) male workers aged 25 to 59 on age,
age squared, dummies for education, race, state, and marital status.
Figure 1: US Wage Inequality
math skills.3 The increasing importance of math skills for college educated individuals
is shown in panel (a) of Figure 2, where increasing wage returns to math skills are set
against the stagnant returns of general ability. In contrast, the non-college group has
experienced the opposite, with decreasing wage returns to math skills set against increasing
returns to general ability. This evidence, combined with the three facts above, suggests
that the US economy has not only experienced SBTC, but also math-biased technical
change (MBTC), where MBTC cannot be exploited through college attendance alone.
More precisely, students who study math-related topics in college will enjoy the largest
wage benefits. Thus, the trends presented in Figure 2 emphasize MBTC as a mechanism
3General- and math ability are measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). General ability is a combination of math- and
verbal abilities for the 1979 cohort (see, Altonji et al., 2012, for details on the construction of standardized
AFQT scores).
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Source: NLSY79 (males aged 14-22 in 1979). Wage returns are computed from yearly regressions of
hourly log wages of full-time workers (at least 35 hours in main job) on standardized AFQT test score,
standardized AFQT math scores, age, age squared, dummies for race, region, marital status, and whether
the individuals lives in a MSA or not.
Figure 2: Wage Returns
underpinning income inequality between college graduates. MBTC is unlikely to be the
main driver of income inequality within the bottom half of the US wage distribution.
The facts and trends discussed above complement the research by Kambourov &
Manovskii (2009), who explain a large part of within-group wage inequality by focusing on
occupational mobility and the cost of switching occupations. They find that occupational
mobility accounts for a significant portion of wage inequality. Similarly, Huggett et al.
(2011) study lifetime inequality by decomposing the contribution between initial human
capital endowment and “luck,” finding that 61.5 percent of the variation in lifetime earnings
are due to initial endowments. However, the authors are silent on the decisions (forces)
that lead to the differences in human capital at age 23. Thus, we expand on this body of
research by modeling the initial conditions that proceed labor force choices. Our approach
differs from Kambourov & Manovskii (2009) and Huggett et al. (2011) by explaining what
shapes the individual heterogeneity at the time of occupational choice (i.e., they do not
model the formal college human capital accumulation process). We believe the formation
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of initial conditions (by age 23 when entering the labor market) to be important, as edu-
cation choices matter for occupation decisions later in life. We show that intra-education
group variance is missed when separating the population strictly by educational attainment
(college, non-college) alone.
Intra-education group income inequality motivate Altonji et al. (2012), who find that
male electrical engineers earn 51.6 percent more than male education majors, which is
comparable to the college wage premium of 57.7 percent. However, due to the empirical
focus of their research, they only estimate disaggregated cross-sectional returns to college
majors with associated math and verbal SAT scores. The authors note that this area
of research is relatively unexplored, but is important for understanding the structural
mechanisms underpinning the ex post outcomes of higher education. A comprehensive
review of the existing empirical studies on the returns to college major can be found in
Table 2 of Altonji et al. (2012). Specifically, the authors note that there is lack of research
explaining why individuals choose different education types, and how this translates into
occupational choices. A crucial difference between our research and Altonji et al. (2012)
is, by using the information on mathematic skill requirements within occupations from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles4 (DOT), we show that mathematics-focused majors are
highly correlated with ex post wage outcomes through the occupational choices available
to these majors. We hypothesize that wage inequality is driven, to a large extent, by
individuals’ initial abilities, which limit education options and, consequently, occupational
choices.
Addressing similar wage discrepancies as Altonji et al. (2012), Silos & Smith (2012) look
at the trade-off between acquiring specific and targeted human capital. They concentrate
on individuals’ choices between education paths leading to specific occupations versus
education paths that have broader applicability, and thus more occupational choice. The
authors show that policies directed at occupation-specific human capital accumulation lead
4Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 1977 and 1991
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to lower income growth and lower inequality. MBTC sits within the broader educational
transition described above. We emphasize the importance of the skill types accumulated,
with particular attention given to mathematics as either a specific necessary ability or as a
strong indicator of associated abilities. Those who have major in math-intensive areas may
initially sort into high-wage occupations, with little incentive of switching (to alternative)
occupations.
Carneiro et al. (2011) and Eisenhauer et al. (2013) explore another dimension of intra-
education group income inequality and find that the returns to college enrollment are
approximately zero for low ability individuals, and possibly negative. MBTC is a potential
mechanism that explains this observation, as math-light college majors, without excep-
tion, occupy the bottom of the college group wage distribution. Furthermore, there is a
significant mass of college graduates with zero and three college math credits.
The idea of SBTC found in Acemoglu (2002), which builds upon the empirical work
of Bartel & Lichtenberg (1987) and Autor et al. (1998), formalizes a model in which the
labor augmenting technical change is divided along the education dimension (college/non-
college). This model has become a workhorse for analyzing and explaining the persistent
increase in the relative wages of college graduates. Our work builds on this existing frame-
work by focusing on the distributional wage changes between college graduates. We add
a separate mechanism that approximates the specific skills driving wage inequality intra-
college graduates.
The college attendance mechanism in this paper is loosely based on Hendricks & Schoell-
man (2014). In that paper the authors look at the discrete education choices of individuals
(i.e., high school, some college, and college), focusing on ex ante abilities as measured by
IQ scores. Their results show that one-third of the college wage premium and one-fourth
of its growth is driven by ability (“ability premium”). While looking at ability as a driver
of wage outcomes, Hendricks & Schoellman (2014) define broad education categories that
mask the sub-group mainly driving wage inequality: the top earning college graduates,
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who exhibit strong mathematical abilities.
This paper is unique in linking ability, acquired math skills, occupations and rising
wage inequality. We aim to explain the evolution of the college graduate wage distribution
using a model that emphasizes MBTC combined with the three facts previously discussed.
The model revolves around the education choice. Individuals make a choice to attempt
college or directly enter the labor market. As we are interested in the outcome of the college
education process, we directly assign individuals math credits subject to ability constraints,
with some individuals dropping out of college. Math credits characterize each college major
in our model. Individuals supply both their ex post ability and any acquired math skills
to the labor market. Only college graduates can supply the math skills associated with
college majors. Firms hire college and non-college labor. Wage inequality is driven by both
generic SBTC and specific MBTC.
Our results highlight the strength of MBTC as a determinant of intra-college graduate
income inequality. With SBTC alone, the college wage premium is matched through all
college graduate wages growing over time, which ignores the observed intra-group trends.
In contrast, a combination of SBTC and MBTC matches both the aggregate and intra-
group trends observed in the data: the stagnation of wages at the bottom of the college
graduate group and the substantial increase in wages for the top college graduates.
Wage inequality across different education groups, mathematic requirements of college
majors and quantitative occupation requirements form the basis of our model. Thus,
Section 2 provides a summary of the data facts related to wage inequality, occupations and
college majors over time and across cohorts. The general equilibrium model is outlined in
Section 3, Section 4 explains the calibration procedure, and Section 5 provides analytical
results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Data
This research relies on three facts listed in the introduction and expanded upon in this
section. Together, these three points present a coherent story of ex ante mathematical
ability dictating college major options, from which occupations and, ultimately, wages
are determined. Those with higher mathematics abilities pursue math-heavy majors and
occupations. These particular occupations also enjoy the highest wages. Furthermore, the
math intensive majors that lead to higher wage occupations are increasingly shunned by
each subsequent generation of college degree holders. This shift away from math-heavy
majors further exacerbates wage inequality.
2.1 Who is Driving Wage Inequality?
To illustrate which education-group subsets are driving wage inequality, we use data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), from which the residual of a Mincer wage
regression is derived from log hourly wages of full-time, full-year males aged 25-59. The
regression controls for age, age-squared, race, marital status, and state of residence (using
CPS weights). The unexplained residual for various education-wage groups are compared
in Figure 3. We use the notationally convenient abbreviations for wage percentiles: “C”
for college, “NC” for non-college, and the “A” for the total population (all).
The cross-education wage-group comparisons highlight the importance of high-earning
college graduates in driving wage inequality, especially since the mid-1980s. Figure 3a
compares the residual wages of the C10 and C20 with the NC80 and NC90 wage groups,
normalized against the A50 (50th percentile in the total sample). The bottom earning
college graduates have significantly lower wages than the upper non-college wage groups
and the average wage. All comparisons show a flat or mild divergence. The final comparison
within Figure 3a shows the bottom college-wage decile has lost ground against the average
individual. To put the average into perspective, college-graduates account for about 30
percent of the sample. That is, the average individual (A50) is a non-college graduate, just
8
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Source: CPS. See Figure 1 for the computation of log hourly wages.
Figure 3: Wage Performance
above the average non-college (NC50) individual (see Figure 3b bottom line).
In contrast to Figure 3a, Figure 3b compares the residual wages of the middle and top
college, and the middle non-college wage groups with the average individual. The C90
wage group has outpaced the C50 wage group by 20 percent since the mid-1970s. This is
a remarkable performance considering the C50 wage group increased their wage premium
against the median individual by approximately 12 percent. For reference, the college
wage premium grew by 22 percent. The implications of this figure are summarized in two
points: (1) the average college graduate is outpacing all other groups, but (2) the top
college graduates are sprinting ahead of everyone. Thus, a large part of wage inequality
growth is driven by the top college-wage groups, while the bottom college-graduates are
left behind compared to a large share of non-college graduates.
2.2 Fact 1: MBTC
As within-group wage inequality is driven by the top earners, it is important to pin
down the characteristics that defines this group. The idea of MBTC is compelling when
considering the relative returns to math and general ability previously presented in Figure
2 for the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) cohort. For college grad-
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Figure 4: Relative Log Hourly Wages of High- to Low-Math Occupations
uates, labor market returns to math have increased over time, with the evidence pointing
to MBTC as the driver. However, estimating MBTC together with SBTC requires a time
series dataset of the US economy. As the American Community Survey (ACS) only has
cross sections for 2009 and 2010, we use the DOT numerical requirements to exploit the
time series dimension of the CPS to further understand the importance of MBTC.5 Figure
4 shows relative log wage rates of college graduates split equally between high- and low-
math occupations6 relative to non-college wage rates. The wage rates are computed using
efficiency units of labor, with more detail on the precise computation found in appendix B.
The relative wages of high-math occupations began to diverge in the mid-1980s, which is
consistent with the beginning of large-scale personal computer adoption, a main driver of
SBTC (Autor et al., 1998). Results suggest that, for college graduates, labor augmenting
5Appendix A provides additional detail about the DOT aptitude measures used in this paper.
6The 50% split means that the cutoff between low- and high-math occupations is such that 50% of
college graduates in 1974 work in high-math occupations. However, the results are not sensitive to this
cutoff, e.g., using a top-third versus bottom two-thirds split yields similar quantitative results.
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Figure 5: Occupation Math Requirements and College-Level Math Credits by Major
technical change on high-math occupations has grown about 16 percent per annum faster
than on low-math occupations. Appendix B provides details on the estimation method for
both SBTC and MBTC over time using the CPS.
2.3 Fact 2: College and Work
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between college majors’ math credits and the numer-
ical skill requirements of occupations in 2010 for individuals aged 23 and 62. The figure
uses the individual-level observations with college major and occupation information from
the ACS, combined with the DOT numerical job requirements.7 All individuals are first
grouped by their college major and the average occupation math requirement is computed,
as there are multiple occupation outcomes within each college major. This figure shows
that occupation-specific math skills are highly correlated with college-level math credits
7The ACS 2010 is used throughout. The ACS 2009 is the first year in which college major is included.
Note that the trends observed in the ACS 2010 are virtually identical to the ACS 2009.
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Figure 6: SAT Math Scores and College-Level Math Credits by Major
by college major, with a 0.65 correlation coefficient.
2.4 Fact 3: College Math and Ability
Looking at the initial characteristics that lead to college major sorting, Figure 6 merges
college-level math credits and mean SAT Math scores by college major from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to individuals in the ACS. The results illustrate
that ex ante abilities are correlated with college-level math credits with a correlation co-
efficient of 0.77. Thus, those with high-math abilities prior to college, as measured by the
average SAT Math scores of those graduating within a specific college major, are more
likely to graduate from math intensive college majors, as measured by college-level math
credits.
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Figure 7: College Major Graduation Share by Cohorts
2.5 Other Measures
The ACS offers a cross-sectional snapshot of college majors in 2010, from which we
construct a measure of how individuals’ college major choice has evolved. This assumes
that most individuals do not go back to school beyond the age of 30, and that the ACS
sample is representative of the population at every age group. Figure 7 illustrates the
changes in degrees obtained, as measured by the share of graduates at each math credit
level of three sample cohorts between the 1960s and 1980s. The figure shows a general
and persistent pattern of college graduates shifting away from relative high-math majors
to low-math majors since the 1960s. Given the general trend toward MBTC in the labor
market, this pattern may seem puzzling. However, the leftward shift in the quality of
college students, suggested by Hendricks & Schoellman (2014) and Heckman & Mosso
(2014), can also explain a shift towards the left in Figure 7. The hypothesis to be tested
in this paper is to precisely determine the importance of MBTC combined with this shift
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Table 1: Ability Measures and Wages
log(w) AbilityG AbilityV AbilityN SATM
AbilityG 0.601*** 1
AbilityV 0.563*** 0.966*** 1
AbilityN 0.846*** 0.766*** 0.719*** 1
SATM 0.609*** 0.598*** 0.571*** 0.725*** 1
SATV 0.387*** 0.565*** 0.551*** 0.502*** 0.796***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
towards low-math majors in generating the observed increase in wage inequality within
college graduates.
Table 1 shows how other measures of ability are correlated with log wages, college
math credits and the usual SAT measures of ex ante math and verbal ability. AbilityG,
AbilityV and AbilityN are the DOT measures for general, verbal and numerical aptitudes,
respectively.8 The results presented here are for all individuals, with similar results across
cohorts. However, the correlation between log wages, general- and verbal ability are smaller
for younger cohorts. For example, individuals aged 28 to 32 in 2010 (the 1980 cohort) have
a correlation between wages and general ability of 0.46, verbal ability of 0.43 and math
ability of 0.78. The population correlations for these same measures is 0.60, 0.56, and
0.85, respectively (see Table 1). This difference may be due to an age-effect when first
entering the labor market, i.e., individuals learn about different occupations and their skill
requirements through experience.
The correlation for math measures (SATM, AbilityN) are 40-60 percent greater than
non-math measures. While this is possibly due to noise within the non-math measures,
the correlation between SATM and SATV is 0.80. This high correlation between math
and verbal scores, despite the much higher correlation between log wages and math scores,
further highlights the special significance of math as either a direct or indirect measure of
high-return skills in the labor market. Note that, with respect to the timing of college-
level education, the DOT ability measures are ex post assessments, whereas the SAT ability
8The DOT measures of ability are detailed in Appendix A.
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measures are ex ante assessments.
3 Model
As this research is focused on the evolution of wage inequality over time, a general equi-
librium model is required to provide the time dynamics that would invariably be ignored
by estimating a regression model on the cross sections of available data. The overlap-
ping generations model used here features a unit mass of finitely lived agents and a single
representative firm.
3.1 Individuals
The model is loosely based on Hendricks & Schoellman (2014). However, the schooling
decision is modified to incorporate a choice between “college majors” and the fact that
individuals face constraints based on their ability. Figure 8 provides the basic model time-
line for individuals. For each generation, there are two primary periods with all decisions
taking place in period 0 and the realization of the decisions occurring in period 1. During
period 0, individuals choose to either enter or forgo college (college or non-college). At the
beginning of period 1, individuals are about 18 years old. If they attempt college there
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are two outcomes: (1) drop out/fail or (2) graduate with a specific degree characterized
by specific acquired math skills, mi. Both college graduates and dropouts enter the labor
force in period 2, with individuals who drop out/fail losing one period of income as an
opportunity cost of attempting college. Each subsequent period, individuals supply their
general ability and acquired math skills to firms in exchange for wages.
Individuals’ decisions within the model are straightforward. Individuals decide to pur-
sue college education or enter the labor market in period 0. This is the only choice available
to individuals in this model. Dropping out is determined by a single ability cutoff. The
college major “choice” is simplified to a direct mapping from human capital, hm, to ac-
quired math skills, m, without an explicit choice. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) and Zafar
(2013) find strong evidence that men optimize their education choices in order to earn the
highest wage return. Also exploring men’s education choices, Paglin & Rufolo (1990) find
empirical evidence that men choose college majors based on their math ability. This result
is similar to that of Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2014), who show that many people
attempt math-heavy college majors, but learn about their abilities through failure. These
people move into college majors with lighter math loads, with the failure and “drop” process
repeating until the student’s ability is matched to the math content of the college major
or they drop out. Thus, for men, combining these results points to a direct mapping from
initial ability to the highest possible college math outcome.
The education choice is determined by weighing the financial benefits against the utility
and opportunity costs (lost wages) of studying. Markets are complete, such that income
maximization and consumption maximization yield the same results, with discounting of
β = 11+r . Thus, the individuals’ objective function is:
max
si
{
N∑
t=2
(
1
1 + r
)t
E
[
p(θ)ωet(θ, θm) + (1− p(θ))ωut(θ)
]− ζi, N∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
E(ωut(θ))
}
.
(1)
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Individuals make a schooling choice, si ∈ {e, u}, between attending college or not.
Individual wages are given by ωijt, with j = {e, u} denoting the college graduate (educated)
or non-college (uneducated) outcomes. Wages are a function of individuals’ initial general
ability, θi. College-graduate wages are, in addition, also a function of individuals’ initial
math ability, θim. The probability of graduating from college is represented by p and
depends on an individuals’ initial general ability, θi. Individuals are heterogeneous across
initial general ability (θi), initial math ability (θim) and taste for college (ζi).
While initial ability is defined in terms of θi and θim, agents are aware that ability
translates into human capital (hi), through a noisy process, that affects their performance
both at school and at work. This process is defined as hi = exp(θi+i) and him = exp(θim+
i) for general and math human capital, respectively. Individuals’ ex ante estimate of their
general and math human capital is given by hˆ and hˆm. Students generally overestimate
their human capital when making schooling choices, which we call overconfidence (for an
empirical motivation see Bordalo et al., 2014, and references therein). This overconfidence
is seen in individuals’ ex ante general and math human capital estimates: hˆ = exp(θ + ˆ)
and hˆm = exp(θm + ˆ), where E(ˆ) > E().
College is not reversible and dropping out occurs only if an individual does not meet
the minimum graduation requirement set by h. I.e., p(θi) = 1 if hi(θ) > h otherwise p = 0
and the individual drops out of college.
Math human capital has no value in the labor market unless an individual studies
math in college. We will approximate this college major matching process by allocating
math credits directly to individuals based on their ability. Acquired math skill in college,
mi(hm), is an increasing function of math human capital,
∂mi(hm)
∂hm
> 0.
The wages for college educated individuals are determined by,
ωiet = wet
(
wheth
i + wmetm
i(hm)
)
exp(ηit), (2)
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where wet are general wage returns to a college degree for general human capital (indexed
h) and acquired math skill (indexed m). A transitory luck component, η, is drawn each
period.
The wages for uneducated individuals are,
ωiut = whuth
i exp(ηit), (3)
as math human capital has no value unless refined in college. Uneducated individuals face
the same transitory luck component, η, as educated individuals.
3.2 Firms
A representative firm hires college and non-college labor to produce a final good (Yt).
The production function is a CES between non-college and college labor. College labor is
a nested-CES between general human capital and math. Non-college labor, by definition,
only supplies general human capital.
Yt =
[
αLνhut + (1− α)
[
λ (AtLhet)
ρ + (1− λ) (AtMtLmet)ρ
]ν/ρ]1/ν (4)
The elasticity of substitution between education types is 11−ν . The elasticity of substi-
tution between general human capital and acquired math skills is 11−ρ . Labor shares are
comprised of two components for educated individuals, general human capital and acquired
math skills, and general human capital alone for uneducated individuals. Formally, labor
shares are defined as,
Lhjt =
∫
i
(1(si=j)h
i)di, ∀j = e, u and Lmet =
∫
i
(1(si=e)m
i)di.
At is skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and Mt is math-biased technical change
(MBTC) over time, with growth rates γat and γmt for SBTC and MBTC, respectively.
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Thus, SBTC is At = (1 + γat)At−1 and MBTC is Mt = (1 + γmt)Mt−1.
The model solutions follow from the firm’s cost minimization problem. If we define
college labor output as,
Yet =
[
λ (Lhet)
ρ + (1− λ) (MtLmet)ρ
]1/ρ
,
with a price of pet = wet, given perfect competition, then the relative demand for college
labor output from the firm’s minimization is,
(
Yet
Lhut
)
demand
=
(
Aνt (1− α)
α
whut
wet
) 1
1−ν
. (5)
Firms demand relatively more college labor when the wage rate decreases or college labor
productivity (At) increases. The relative demand for acquired math skills (“college math”)
from the firm’s solution is,
(
Lmet
Lhet
)
demand
=
(
Mρt (1− λ)
λ
whet
wmet
) 1
1−ρ
. (6)
Firms demand relatively more college math when the wage rate decreases or the produc-
tivity of acquired math skills (Mt) increases.
3.3 Equilibrium
The general equilibrium conditions are dependent on the individuals’ and the firm’s
optimization problems.
An equilibrium, given wage rates {whut, wet, whet, wmet}, is defined by:
1. The education choice, si = {e, u}, that maximizes the individual problem, subject to
the graduation constraint hi ≥ h;
2. The demand for labor {Lhut, Lhet, Lmet}, that minimizes the firm’s production cost;
and
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3. Labor markets clear, both for general human capital, (Lhjt)demand = (Lhjt)supply for
j = {e, u}, and for college math, (Lmet)demand = (Lmet)supply.
3.4 Dynamics
To compute actual wage rates, the final good price is normalized to one, pt = 1. Using
the unit cost of producing one unit of output, it is straight forward to derive all wages
from Equations (4)-(6). The wage rates of college labor input are,
whet = wetλ
1/ρ
(
1 +
Mρt (1− λ)
λ
(
Lmet
Lhet
)ρ)(1−ρ)/ρ
(7)
and
wmet = whet
Mρt (1− λ)
λ
(
Lhet
Lmet
)1−ρ
, (8)
where
wet = At(1− α)1/ν
(
1 +
α
Aνt (1− α)
(
Lhut
Yet
)ν)(1−ν)/ν
. (9)
SBTC (At) increases the returns to all college labor. There are two channels that increase
the returns to math college, (1) a direct technical change effect, and (2) an indirect supply
effect. First, MBTC (Mt) increases the returns to college math directly. Second, a relatively
faster increase in general human capital compared to the supply of college math, LhetLmet ,
given an elasticity parameter of ν < 1, also increases the wage rate on college math, wmet.
Therefore, consistent with our main hypothesis, if individuals are constrained in learning
math, or new college entrants are unable to learn/study math, it is possible that the returns
to math increase faster than the returns to college, leading to a larger spread between the
top and bottom percentile wages within the college educated group. As a consequence, the
larger the absolute number of college entrants, given that every new marginal entrant will
have a lower ability level, the larger the post-education wage inequality. For completeness
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the wage rate of uneducated workers is determined by,
whut = wet
α
Aνt (1− α)
(
Yet
Lhut
)1−ν
, (10)
where the non-college relative wage decreases with SBTC, which is consistent with the
SBTC literature.
4 Calibration
The model parameters can be grouped into four categories: (1) standard parameter val-
ues, {β,N}; (2) individual-specific parameters, {µθ, σθ, σζ , µˆ, σ, ση}; (3) college-specific
parameters, {δ0, δ1, h,m}; and (4) firm-specific parameters {γjt, α, λ, ν, ρ}. Each category
of parameters is discussed in separate subsections below. The calibration procedure esti-
mates all parameter values jointly.
4.1 General Parameters
The model has five-year time periods and is simulated for seven periods, from 1980
to 2010. We start the model economy at 1980 for two reasons: (1) the 1960 cohort of
the NLSY79 is the first reasonable target available, i.e., individuals making their college
decisions in 1980; and (2) the Vietnam War distorted the college decision of cohorts born
before 1960, as the draft could be avoided by college enrollment (see Lemieux & Card,
2001). In addition, the decompositions in Section 2 show that income divergence began
around 1980, with a relatively flat trend between 1975 and 1980. The model uses a standard
discount factor of β = 0.9 per period, which implies a discount rate of approximately two
percent per year.
We set N = 9, meaning that individuals live for nine periods after the college/no-college
decision. Thus, each period contains nine generations and the modeled working life-time
of an individual covers the equivalent of 45-years. As the period 0 decision is assumed to
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take place around the age of 18, the model covers the age range of 18 to 63. The simulation
accounts for the baby boom/bust that generates different cohort sizes. However, the results
are not sensitive to these cohort size differences.
4.2 Individual and Education Specific Parameters
The individual and education parameters interact directly. Therefore, this subsection
discusses these two parameter groups together. Given that the NLSY79 was administered
to individuals aged 14 to 22 in 1979, and model simulations start in 1980, we drop the
youngest individuals for NLSY targets described below. That is, we match the 1960 cohort
definition, only including individuals born before 1963.
Initial ability and human capital. The two types of initial ability, general (θ) and
math (θm), are distributed normally. Formally, θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ) and θm ∼ N(0, σ2θ). The
correlation (ρ) between initial general ability and initial math ability is set to φ = 0.9367,
matching the correlation between SAT I and SAT I Math scores in the ACS, E(θm) = φθ.
To generate the mapping between initial ability measures (θ and θm) and human capital
(h and hm), the noisy process  is assumed N(0, σ2 ). The ex ante process ˆ is also assumed
N(µˆ, σ
2
 ).
Schooling choice. Preferences for studying impact the initial college/no college school-
ing choice. Study preferences are defined by ζ, which can be considered an individual’s
taste for college. While individuals sort into college based on their initial ability, Figure
9 shows that this sorting is not perfect. Thus, ζ ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ), where a negative ζ is a cost
and a positive ζ is “love” for studying.
Schooling outcome. There are two outcomes for those who attempt college education:
(1) dropout/failure or (2) graduate in a college major characterized by math credits. In
the model, the dropout rate is governed by a minimum human capital standard, h, which
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Source: NLSY79. Males born before 1963 (1960 cohort). Standardized test scores as computed by the
method of Altonji et al. (2012).
Figure 9: Ability Distribution by Education Type
is assumed constant over time. Those who do not drop out of college accumulate a repre-
sentative measure of acquired math skill in college (mi), with functional form,
mi = min {m,max (0, δ0 + δ1 exp(hm))} . (11)
Math acquired in college is subject to a cap, m, which is set to match the share of
individuals with 21 or more math credits in the 1960 cohort. The choice of 21 math credits
is driven by returns to math credits in the ACS sample. A regression of math credits and
math credits squared on wages, controlling for a number of characteristics, for full-time
full-year male employees, suggests an increasing and concave relationship for the returns
up-to 21 college math credits (see Figure 10). The returns to additional credits above 21
flattens and then drops sharply at 40 credits. These 40-credit college majors are primarily
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Source: ACS, NCES. Math credit returns are computed from a regression of hourly log wages of full-time
(at least 35 hours of work and 40 weeks per year) male workers aged 25 to 59 on math credits, math credits
squared, age, age squared, dummies for education, race, marital status, and year.
Figure 10: ACS Returns to College Math Credits
math majors. We argue that numerical skills and the tools learned in mathematics are
valuable on the job market, but we do not, per se, think that esoteric math courses (e.g.,
chaos and dynamical systems) are the main driving force. However, the US share of college
graduates with 40 credits is small.9
The number of college graduates studying zero math credits can be seen in Figure 7.
These individuals will benefit from SBTC, but not from MBTC. We define δ0 such that
the share of college graduates from the 1960 cohort with zero math credits is matched.
Given the mapping function for mi, δ0 will be a negative value.
9Only 1.6 percent of college graduates within the entire 2009/2010 sample obtain 40 math credits.
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Additional wage component. The model features a standard luck component (e.g.,
Storesletten et al., 2001) in wages over the life-cycle. For the precise process used in this
paper, see Guvenen & Kuruscu (2010). This luck component is i.i.d. with mean zero and
standard deviation ση.
Remaining moment conditions. The six structural parameters that do not have a one-
to-one mapping to empirical moments are estimated by matching seven US data targets
simultaneously. The seven moments that govern individual actions pertain to the 1960
cohort (i.e., individuals making education choices in 1980) or the year 1980. We group the
moments that we believe to be particularly informative of a given parameters.
• h is governed by the college dropout rate in 1980. Although there is a wide range
of estimates for the dropout rate, we use estimates by Bound et al. (2010) for two
reasons: (1) the authors provide estimates disaggregated by gender; and (2) their
definition aligns with our interpretation of college dropouts. That is, the college
dropout rate defined as the share of all individuals age 25 in 1980, who have some
college but lack a four-year college degree. More importantly for our research, the
results presented below are not sensitive to the precise value of the dropout rate.
Note that the model generates an increasing college dropout rate over time, which is
a characteristic that the literature agrees on (for example, Bound et al., 2010; Bailey
& Dynarski, 2011, both show a rise in college dropout rates).
• µˆ, σ, σζ are determined by the average general ability of college graduates (NLSY79,
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)), the correlation of high school GPA and
freshman college GPA of 0.4 (Rothstein, 2004), and the average ability of non-college
workers (NLSY79, AFQT). That is, h provides a clear dropout cutoff, with over-
confidence, µˆ, contributing to the dropout rate, i.e., people attempt college who
cannot graduate. Uncertainty over actual abilities is generated by σ, with a large
literature suggesting that SAT scores and high school performance are an imperfect
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measure of college performance, and significant information about own ability being
revealed through studying at a college level.10 Lastly, σζ generates imperfect sorting,
since individuals have idiosyncratic preferences for school, which translates into a
larger variance in the ability of college graduates. This variance is used to explain
differences in the average ability between college and non-college individuals.
• σθ and δ1 are determined through three 1980 relative log wage targets: NC90-NC10,
C90-C50, and C90-C10. These second moments cover the main intra-group inequal-
ity measures that we believe are important. Note that the model has an extra wage
target. This additional second moment will provide information on the relevant
parameters determining variance: σθ, σ and σζ . Thus, this extra wage target is im-
portant in matching both first and second moments when analyzing wage inequality
in the model.
4.3 Firm-Specific Parameters
There are four parameters associated with the firm that must be pinned down in 1980,
along with two time trends.
Time invariant firm parameters. Two parameters are set outside the estimation pro-
cedure. More precisely, the parameter ν is set within the range of standard estimate
for college to non-college labor elasticities (see Autor et al., 1998, 2008), and the share
parameter on human capital is normalized, λ = 0.5.
The parameters α and ρ are pinned down by matching the share of college graduates
(age 25 to 30) in 1980 and the college wage premium in 1980. The resulting elasticity
parameter is in line with estimates in Appendix B, ρ = 0.707.11
10Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2013) find that 45 percent of the college dropout rate at Berea College
(a small liberal arts college in Kentucky) can be explained by students learning their academic performance
in the first two years of college.
11Alternatively, using the ACS data, but instead computing elasticities across occupations rather than
time, as in Appendix B, yields similar results as the calibration, with the interval of plus/minus one
standard suggesting ρ ∈ [0.33, 0.72]. However, since this method is subject to various assumptions related
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Time trends. Given the definition of SBTC and MBTC, we normalize A and M to one
in 1980. By definition, a rise in At will affect both the returns to college ability and math
equally, but a rise inMt will only increase the returns to math. We restrict the growth rate
of SBTC such that γa,t ∈ [0.018, 0.028], which follows from the range of estimates found
in Table 2 of Autor et al. (2008). The two growth rates are then calibrated to match the
rise in the share of college graduates from 1980 to 2010, along with the rise in the college
wage premium. This process yields a SBTC growth rate of γa = 0.027 per annum, which
lies at the upper range of possible estimates. As relatively high SBTC decreases the effect
of MBTC (Section 3.4), the SBTC growth rate estimate is conservative. The calibration
suggests that MBTC is substantial during this time period, with γm = 0.043. We present
a counterfactual is Section 5.1 to understand how important this precise value of γm is for
the model.
4.4 Calibration Summary
Table 2 summarizes the estimated and calibrated parameters, with estimated parame-
ters above the center line and calibrated parameters at the bottom.
The 1980 data targets used in pinning down the calibrated parameters are summarized
in Table 3. The model does well in matching all targets. It only slightly overpredicts the
average ability of college graduates and the C90-C50 wage differential of college graduates.
For the time trends, the model is unable to match the full rise in the share of college
graduates by 2010. However, the model is able to match the share of new college graduates
in 2010. This discrepancy can be explained by the draft during the VietnamWar generating
above average college graduation rates (Lemieux & Card, 2001).
to the computation of relative wage returns, efficiency units and grouping of occupations, our preferred
estimate is using the calibrated elasticity.
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Table 2: Calibration Summary
Parameter Value Source / Type
β 0.9 standard discounting
N 9 retirement at 63 (5 year periods)
ση 0.367 transitory wage luck (Guvenen & Kuruscu, 2010)
θi ∼ N(0, σ2θ) initial ability NLSY79
ν 0.597 elasticity parameter: college to non-college (Autor et al., 2008)
λ 0.5 ability share parameter - normalized
A0t 1.0 SBTC 1980 - normalized
M0t 1.0 MBTC 1980 - normalized
σθ 0.142 initial ability
µˆ 0.229 overconfidence
σ 0.205 unknown ability component
σζ 0.042 utility of studying
δ0 -2.953 zero math outcome
δ1 2.769 math skill slope
h 0.109 minimum college requirement
m 0.625 maximum math credits
α 0.411 college share parameter
ρ 0.707 elasticity parameter: ability to math
γa 0.027 SBTC growth rate
γm 0.043 MBTC growth rate
Table 3: Targets Summary
Target Data (1980) Model
Fraction 0 Math Credits 0.113 0.113
Fraction 21 Math Credits 0.118 0.118
College Dropout Rate 0.550 0.548
corr(θ, h) 0.400 0.401
θcollege graduate 0.805 0.821
θnon−college worker -0.282 -0.275
C90-C50 0.568 0.579
C90-C10 1.174 1.154
NC90-NC10 1.104 1.072
College Wage Premium 0.247 0.247
Young College Graduates 0.241 0.247
2010 College Graduates 0.301 0.281
2010 College Wage Premium 0.493 0.495
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Table 4: US Wage Inequality & Model Results
Relative Log Wages
Year 90-10 90-50 50-10
All
Data 1980 116 55 62
2010 150 77 73
Model 1980 112 55 57
2010 126 67 59
% Explained 42 52 23
College
Data 1980 117* 57* 61
2010 145 74 72
Model 1980 118* 59* 58
2010 144 71 73
% Explained 92 68 131
* Moment targeted in the calibration
5 Results
The model accurately captures a variety of inequality dynamics, including part of the
general wage trends and all of the intra-college group wage decomposition between 1980
and 2010. These results are driven by the introduction of MBTC into a standard SBTC
framework. The counterfactual presented in Section 5.1 confirms that MBTC must be
present in order to match the wage trends of college graduates at both the top and bottom
deciles.
The rise in the fraction of college graduates and the college wage premium are matched
by construction. Table 4 compares the total US inequality trends and the modeled results.
The base model explains close to half of the rise in inequality of the aggregate US male
population.
The model’s strength lies in explaining intra-college income inequality, given that
MBTC only impacts educated individuals. The model explains almost all the trends for
college graduates, both at the top and bottom. At the other end of the income distribution,
none of the aggregate non-college trends, NC90-NC10, NC-90-NC50 and NC50-NC10, are
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Figure 11: Model Wage Trend Decomposition
well explained.
The detailed decompositions in Figures 11 provide the answer to why the increase in
wage inequality within the non-college group is not generated by the model. The model
matches the NC80-A50 and NC50-A50 wage evolution, but it predicts a slight fall in both
the NC90-A50 and a large fall in the NC10-A50 percentile (not pictured). In contrast, the
data shows a mild increase in the NC90-A50 relative wage and a decrease in the NC10-A50
relative wage. That is, the model is able to replicate the average uneducated worker’s wage,
but not the extremes. These unmatched trends are unsurprising, as the model ignores the
human capital accumulation of uneducated individuals (e.g., dropping out of high school
or completing vocational 2-year college programs) and MBTC only affects college labor
directly. Therefore, the model is more suited to predict income trends within the top half
of the distribution, which includes all college graduates. Both Figures 11a and 11b show an
almost perfect matching of the the college distribution across the top (C90-A50, C80-A50),
average (C50-A50), and the bottom (C20-A50, C10-A50) deciles.
Initial ability. The NLSY79 and NLSY97 show that ex ante ability, as measured by the
AFQT of college graduates, has fallen from 0.805 to 0.775. Since individuals were aged
12 to 16 in the NLSY97 sample, the natural comparison of college cohorts in the model is
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2000-2005. The model slightly overpredicts the average initial ability in 1980 and predicts
a fall to 0.769 by 2000 and 0.754 by 2005. While the fall is slightly larger than observed
from the NLSY79 to NLSY97, the estimates are close to suggest that the model is not
generating the above wage trends through an incorrect composition of college graduates.
Dropout rate. The model generates a rise in the college dropout rate from the matched
target of 55 percent in 1980 to 59 percent by 2010. Bound et al. (2010) show that the
non-completion rate for males aged 25 went from about 55 percent in 1980 to about 60
percent in 2000. By the year 2000 the model generates a dropout rate of 58 percent, just
shy of the data estimates.
College math credits (0 and 21). The model shifts each subsequent cohort towards
lower college math levels. In the 1960 cohort 11.3 percent of college graduates (in both the
data and model) had zero math credits. By the 1980 cohort this number had risen to 14.9
percent in the data and 14.8 percent in the model. Looking at the fraction of individuals
with 21 credits or more, the data falls from 11.8 percent for the 1960 cohort to 10.0 percent
for the 1980 cohort. The model replicates just over one-third of this drop, generating a fall
from 11.8 to 11.1 percent from 1980 to 2010 for new college graduates.
College majors. Figures 7 and 12 compare the share of college graduates over all math
outcomes (“college majors”). As math is a continuous variable within the model, the figure
is computed by scaling all math outcomes such that the maximum possible credits is 21,
and then rounded up to the nearest three credit equivalent. The model, using a simple
math technology, does well in matching the overall shape and evolution of college graduates
over math outcomes. However, the continuous math outcome variable in the model leads
to a smaller mass around three credits compared to the data. It should be noted that a
large share of college majors might only require three math credits to graduate, suggesting
a kink in the college math “production function.” Since the model studies aggregates at
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Figure 12: College Major Graduation Share by Cohorts
the top and bottom of the wage distribution, this is not of first order importance for the
results.
5.1 Counterfactual
We assess the importance of the returns to math by setting γm,t = 0. The removal
of the MBTC mechanism clearly reveals the contribution of the returns to acquired math
skill. The counterfactual model predicts more individuals attempting college, with a college
dropout rate of 60.4 percent in 2010, but also more individuals graduating from college,
with the share of college graduates increasing to 28.6 percent in 2010 from 28.1 percent in
the benchmark model. The share of zero-math credit graduates increases to 15.9 percent
and the share of individuals with 21 credits decreases to 10.8 percent by 2010. Simultane-
ously, the average quality of a college graduate drops from 0.744 to 0.712 in terms of initial
ability.
Table 5 compares the 2010 wage inequality levels between the data, the benchmark
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Table 5: US Wage Inequality & Counterfactual Results
Relative Log Wages
Year 90-10 90-50 50-10
All
Data 2010 150 77 73
SBTC + MBTC 2010 126 67 59
SBTC 2010 129 68 62
% SBTC Explained 51 55 42
College
Data 2010 145 74 72
SBTC + MBTC 2010 144 71 73
SBTC 2010 118 60 58
% SBTC Explained 3 4 1
model and the counterfactual model results, omitting the 1980 values, as they are identical
to Table 4 by construction. At an aggregate level, the counterfactual model is marginally
better than the benchmark model in matching broad income inequality trends, particularly
at the bottom of the wage distribution. However, these broad measurements hide the intra-
college inequality trends that are ignored by the counterfactual model. The second part
of Table 5 shows that the counterfactual model is unable to match any of the trends in
wage inequality between college graduates, explaining only one to four percent of the rise
in inequality from 1980 to 2010.
Figure 13 further highlights how the counterfactual model matches the aggregated in-
come inequality trends for the wrong reasons. The counterfactual predicts a sharp increase
in wages for the bottom college deciles and a sharp fall for wages of the top non-college
deciles. This first point is driven by higher returns to the general human capital of college
graduates (relative to math). The non-college results are driven by composition. That is,
more low ability students enter and graduate from college, effectively decreasing the ability
of the top non-college deciles.
The mechanisms of SBTC and MBTC work in opposite directions for the bottom of
the college distribution. SBTC alone benefits all college graduates in wage terms. The
bottom deciles, in particular, gain compared with the average individual in the economy.
33
-
0.
40
-
0.
20
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
C20-A50 Model C20-A50 Data
C10-A50 Model C10-A50 Data
NC90-A50 Model NC90-A50 Data
NC80-A50 Model NC80-A50 Data
R
el
at
iv
e 
Ln
 W
ee
kl
y 
W
ag
es
Figure 13: US Wage Inequality & Counterfactual Results
Further highlighting the broad power of the SBTC mechanism, the counterfactual pushes
the income of the C20 group above the A50 wage, while the C10 wage approaches parity
with the A50 wage. In contrast, MBTC is effective at only increase the top income deciles,
leaving the bottom deciles with decreasing or stagnant wages. Thus, only the combination
of these two different technical change concepts can generate the observed wage inequality
trends of the US male college graduate population, along with part of the divergence in
wages across the entire US male population.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of math in determining both inter- and intra-education
group wage inequality. The connection between ex ante math abilities, college math, and
the labor demand for math skills provides a simple and powerful mechanism, explaining
a large component of male wage inequality in the US. The estimated structural model
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highlights the importance of MBTC in explaining both aggregate wage inequality and the
wage trends at the extremes of the college distribution. The model is also able to generate
average trends for both college and non-college groups, closely matching the general trends
achieved by SBTC alone.
Given the results, there a number of interesting research extensions. As we extend the
research on the determinants of wage inequality from a post-education perspective (Kam-
bourov & Manovskii, 2009; Huggett et al., 2011) to a pre-college education perspective, we
assume initial math ability is determined prior to college. Given the central role of math,
studying the origins of initial math skills is of primary importance in determining college
math outcomes and is a natural first extension of the MBTC mechanism presented here. A
second research extension focuses on the gender dimension of education choices to investi-
gate the characteristics of the college majors favored by women. While men optimize their
education choices to maximize pecuniary outcomes and choose high-math college majors
given initial ability constraints, women exhibit more complex preferences with respect to
non-pecuniary outcomes that seem to distort the education decision. In ongoing work, we
study women’s college decisions in a life-cycle model that accounts for atrophy and repair
of skills due to career breaks.
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A Data Appendix: Aptitude Measures
This appendix lists the definition of the three DOT variables referenced in the paper.
The three aptitude variables used are from the DOT 1977 and 1991 editions. We are
unable to use the DOT successor, the Occupational Information Network (O*net), due to
a measurement discontinuity in the recorded aptitudes.
In general, aptitudes measure the ability an individual must possess in order to perform
a job successfully. More precisely, the measure is a function of the share in the population
that meets this ability level. That is, there are five categories: (1) the bottom 10 percent
of the population, (2) the bottom third excluding the bottom 10 percent , (3) the middle
third, (4) the top third excluding the top 10 percent, and (5) the top 10 percent. We
translate these measures to a scale ranging from zero to one, e.g., an aptitude above 0.66
would correspond to an individual in the top-third of the population.
Out of the 11 measures reported in the DOT 1977 and 1991, we use the three measures:
general, numerical and verbal ability.
• General ability is the ability to understand instructions, understand principles and
to make judgments. It encompasses a number of skills, e.g., using logic and scientific
thinking, understanding procedures, establishing facts and drawing conclusions, etc.
This measure is highly correlated with the ability to perform well in school.
• Numerical aptitude is the ability to perform arithmetic. The complexity and speed
of operations is taken into account when assigning the category.
• Verbal aptitude is the ability to understand and use language effectively. Both oral
and written skills, including the use of technical terminology, are taken into account
when assigning categories for each occupation.
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B Empirical Appendix: Estimating MBTC Over Time
Figure 4 graphs the relative wage rates between high-math college and non-college occu-
pations, and low-math college and non-college occupations. Relative wages are normalized
to zero in 1974 for easy comparison of the two MBTC and SBTC trends.
Relative labor supplies and, consequently, relative wages rates, are computed following
Hansen (1993) in estimating labor efficiency units at time t as,
LEjt =
∑
k
ψkLjt,k, (B.1)
where Ljt,k is the total labor supply of group k of labor type j = {u, e,me} (non-college
(u), low-math college labor (e) and high-math labor (me)), and ψk is the group’s weight.
Weights are determined by,
ψk =
ωk
ω
, (B.2)
the average log weekly wage of group k over the average wage of the entire population
(across individuals over the entire time period). Groups are made up of a given five-year
birth cohort, sex and education group (high school dropout, high school graduate, some
college, college graduate, and post-graduate).
Using this definition of efficiency units of labor, log relative wage rates are,
ln(wjt)− ln(wut) =
∑
k
fjt,k
ωjt,k
LEjt
−
∑
k
fut,k
ωut,k
LEut
for j = e,me, (B.3)
where fjt,k is the fraction of group k of labor type j individuals in the economy each period.
B.1 Quantifying MBTC versus SBTC
Given wage rates and relative labor supplies, we can quantify the difference between
SBTC and MBTC as captured in Figure 4.
Analogous to the firms problem in Section 3, we define a nested-CES between the three
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types of labor j = {u, e,me},
Yt =
[
αLνut + (1− α)
[
λ (AtLet)
ρ + (1− λ) (AtMtLmet)ρ
] ν
ρ
] 1
ν
, (B.4)
with SBTC (labor augmenting technology for all college graduates equally) as, At = (1 +
γat)At−1 and MBTC (labor augmenting technology for high-math labor only) as, Mt =
(1 + γmt)Mt−1.
From the firm’s cost minimization problem, we obtain two relative wage equations,
ln
(
wet
wut
)
≈ (B.5)
C + (ν − 1) ln
(
Let
Lut
)
+ ν ln (At) +
1− λ
λ
Mρt
(
ν − ρ
ρ
)(
Lmet
Let
)ρ
and
ln
(
wmet
wut
)
≈ (B.6)
C + (ν − 1) ln
(
Lmet
Lut
)
+ ν ln (At) + ν ln (Mt) +
λ
1− λ
(
1
Mt
)ρ(ν − ρ
ρ
)(
Let
Lmet
)ρ
.
Equation (B.5) shows the college premium of low-math college graduates relative to non-
college labor, and Equation (B.6) shows the relationship between high-math college grad-
uate wages and non-college wage returns. As in Krusell et al. (2000), we can analyze the
growth in relative wages using these two equations, assuming λ = 1− λ,
gwet − gwut = (ρ− 1)gLet − (ν − 1)gLut + νgAt + (ν − ρ) (gLmet + gMt) (B.7)
and
gwmet − gwut = (ρ− 1)gLmet − (ν − 1)gLut + νgAt + ρgMt + (ν − ρ)gLet . (B.8)
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Table 6: College-Labor CES
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Time 0.002∗∗ (0.000)
Labor Supply -0.274∗ (0.104)
Intercept -0.035 (0.066)
N 37
R2 0.821
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
With the two Equations (B.7) and (B.8) we can compute the two unknowns of interest,
gAt = γat and gMt = γmt.
Having computed efficiency units of labor and relative wages rates from the CPS 1974
to 2010, all that remains is pinning down the elasticities between college and non-college
labor, 11−ν , and between low- and high-math labor,
1
1−ρ . The parameter ν = 0.597 is set
as in the simulation (see Section 4). However, ρ used here is not directly comparable with
the parameter from Section 3. Therefore, in the appendix we estimate ρ using CPS data.
The firm’s nested-CES minimization problem provides the following relative wage equa-
tion,
ln(wmet)− ln(wet) = ln
(
(1− λ)
λ
)
+ ρ ln(Mt) + (ρ− 1) ln
(
Lmet
Lhet
)
. (B.9)
Assuming a linear time trend for ln(Mt), we can estimate this equation using relative wages
and efficiency units of labor to obtain ρ. Table 6 summarizes the results. The parameter
ρ = 0.726 is significant at five percent.12 In contrast, the equivalent regression for non-
college labor suggests perfect substitution between low- and high-math uneducated labor.
This is also consistent with the findings of Figure 2b.
With the elasticity parameters, ρ = 0.726 and ν = 0.597, we can compute the growth
in At and Mt to be consistent with the growth in relative wages of non-college/college and
low-/high-math labor, given the growth in efficiency units from the CPS during 1974 to
2010.
12The elasticity is not sensitive to the precise partitioning of low- and high-math occupations. For
example, splitting the sample by the the top-third versus bottom two-third yields similar results.
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Using the whole time period, this simple accounting exercise suggests that γet = 0.021
and γmet = 0.003. That is, MBTC is positive and larger than zero. To put this value into
perspective, comparing At versus At×Mt, the growth rates suggest that labor augmenting
technical change on high-math occupations grew about 16 percent per annum faster than
on low-math occupations.
For robustness, using ρ of plus/minus one standard deviation, ρ = 0.621 and ρ =
0.830, the relative growth of At ×Mt is 14 and 17 percent larger, respectively. The more
complimentary the two types of college labor, the smaller MBTC needs to be to match the
relative wage growth of both low- and high-math labor to non-college labor.
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